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1 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The North Laos [] Support Problem -- []

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1. There has been a good deal of confusion in recent days with respect to the US Government's -- i. e., Vientiane Station's -- requirements for [] support in north Laos and the steps taken, in train or theoretically authorized to meet these requirements. This confusion has been compounded within the past 48 hours by MACV's withdrawal of four aircraft temporarily loaned to augment north Laos resources.

[] This memorandum attempts to sort out the various factors involved, present a comprehensive status report on the current situation and offer certain action recommendations for your consideration.

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mission, i.e., prosecution of the war in Vietnam. In our view, the level of resources allocated to north Laos requirements has always been, and remains today, unacceptably low. As one small example of the prevailing disproportionate imbalance, during the week ending 21 February, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and this proportional allocation is typical.

7. During the past ten months, the following steps have been taken [REDACTED]

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9. The intelligence needs, and the Station's critical requirements for [] are clear. It is equally clear that MACV apparently will not, [] meet them without a direct order from a very high level. I have struck out, General Cushman has struck out, and [] was probably out before he ever reached the plate. What now seems necessary is your intervention qua DCI and USIB Chairman with Wheeler, Laird, or the President (via Kissinger). We can discuss the optimum mechanics of such intervention at our 1 April meeting. You may want to hit all three in sequence to eliminate any complaints about going over someone's head on a problem he "would have solved." The problem is not likely to be solved, however, unless or until someone with sufficient clout to make them stick gives direct, discussion-foreclosing orders.

[]

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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Attachments

[]

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver []

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DATE: 2 April 1970

TO: General Cushman

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

The attached was shown to the Director on the afternoon of 1 April. He immediately called Secretary Laird, and followed up the call with a memorandum sent to Laird that same evening. The 1 April memo to Laird is the memorandum the Director mentioned at the 2 April Executive Committee meeting.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: DDP

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